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ABSTRACT

A recent Biological Conservation1 paper found that while conservationists behave more
sustainably than other professionals in some respects (e.g. compost more), they still have
much room to improve. Three key domains of behavior the paper tested were meat
consumption, daily commuting behavior, and air travel. In this research, we analyzed the
voluntary comments people made in response to questions about their behavior in these
areas to seek a better understanding of how conservationists explain or rationalize their
behavior despite their knowledge of how their behavior impacts the environment. The
results revealed that conservationists were more likely to rationalize their meat
consumption behavior than economists. Otherwise, there was not a significant difference
between the likelihood of conservationists, economists, and medical professionals to
rationalize their behavior. The most common types of rationalizations used by
respondents to justify their unsustainable behavior were Self-Sanctions and Moral
Justification. Interestingly, the rationalizations offered in the comments of the
respondents also took the form of Positive Self-Reactions, or self-praise for behaving in a
sustainable manner. A future line of study could assess the efficacy of interrupting the
ability of people to rationalize their unsustainable behavior as a leverage point to alter
behavior.

[1] Balmford, A., Cole, L., Sandbrook, C., & Fisher, B. (2017). The environmental footprints of
conservationists, economists and medics compared. Biological Conservation, 214, 260-269.
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biocon.2017.07.035
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INTRODUCTION
Many conservationists disapprove of behavior that is bad for the environment but
engage in it in their personal lives nonetheless. The fact that many conservationists fly
multiple times per year to their conservation sites or to scientific conferences is evidence
of this paradox (Bossdorf, Parepa, & Fischer, 2010; Waring, Teisl, Manandhar, &
Anderson, 2014; Fois, Cuena-Lombraña, Fristoe, Fenu, & Bacchetta, 2016; Alcock et al.,
2017).
Andrew Balmford, Lizzy Cole, Chris Sandbrook, and Brendan Fisher decided to
investigate this phenomenon by conducting a questionnaire-based survey of 300
conservationists (people linked to conservation groups), 207 economists (people linked to
economics groups), and 227 medics (people linked to biomedical groups) across 10
domains of behavior considered to have significant environmental impacts (Balmford,
Cole, Sandbrook, and Fisher, 2017). The aim of the survey was to see how the ecological
footprints of conservationists compared to comparable—in terms of educational and
applied characteristics—professionals.
Because of their occupation, it is assumed that conservationists have received a
significant amount of education about human impacts on the environment. According to
earlier research, this should mean that conservationists exhibit a proportional amount of
pro-environmental behavior in their daily lives (Carter, 1998; Arcury, 1990). However,
the Balmford research demonstrates is that this is not the case across all dimensions of
behavior. The survey found that conservationists do more to reduce their domestic energy
use, take less personal flights, recycle more, and eat less meat than the other professionals
surveyed, but they do not differ in how they commute to work and own more pets
(Balmford et al., 2017). These results contribute to the growing body of research that has
demonstrated that the relationship between environmental knowledge and proenvironmental behavior is incredibly nuanced and not as direct as previously thought
(Arcury, 1990; Bamberg & Möser, 2007; Bolderdijk, Gorsira, Keizer, & Steg, 2013;
Balmford et al., 2017).
Why are people behaving dissonant to their knowledge of the environmental
impacts their behavior will cause and their values? Research has concluded that the
reason is a complicated intermingling of internal and external factors, such as the habits,
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social norms, demographics, responsibilities, culture, and economic status the individual
has (Steg & Vlek, 2009; Bamberg & Möser, 2007; Gifford & Nilsson, 2014; Kollmuss &
Agyeman, 2002). All of these factors, and many more, can influence one’s ability and
likelihood to behave in a pro-environmental way.
How is it that conservationists are able to transgress their morals and values and
choose to behave in an unsustainable manner? Research suggests that neutralizations are
to blame (Bersoff, 1999; Tsang, 2002; Antonetti & Maklan, 2014). Conservationists are
able to justify their behavior by rationalizing it away. This is something that everyone is
guilty of; however, rationalization becomes an issue when it facilitates the perpetuation
of immoral or negative behavior. For conservationists, this is especially problematic
because the occupation requires influencing others to behave in an environmentally
sound and sustainable manner (Balmford et al., 2017). If the very same people who are
calling on others to alter their behavior are not able to modify their own, perhaps we need
to make a change in how we conduct conservation work. The authors of the Balmford
paper suggested that perhaps tailoring interventions to target higher-impact behaviors
could be more effective than the current approach.
After reading the Balmford paper, I was curious, did the conservationists who
took the survey rationalize their behavior in their responses? Furthermore, did
conservationists rationalize their behavior more than the other professionals surveyed?
These central questions are the focus of my research. Professor Brendan Fisher gave me
access to the survey data, and I found ample evidence that respondents had rationalized
their unsustainable behavior. I wanted to know what kind of rationalizations they used.
Research has found that interrupting one’s ability to neutralize their actions can change
their behavior (Bersoff, 1999; Antonetti & Maklan, 2014). Thus, these results could help
determine types of intervention strategies that could be utilized to interrupt the ability of
the individual to rationalize his or her behavior. Inhibiting the ability of someone to
neutralize his or her unsustainable behavior could be the key to leveraging
conservationists and people of all occupations alike to live more sustainable lifestyles
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Preface
The following literature review synthesizes the information relevant to my
research on rationalizing unsustainable behavior. The literature I delve into aims to give a
multidisciplinary perspective on the topics discussed and context for my research. What
follows is information supporting the assumption that conservationists knowledge of
what pro-environmental behavior is, reviewing the paradox of conservationists behaving
unsustainably, evaluating the impact environmental education has on altering behavior,
reasons people transgress their morals, and how people rationalize their immoral
behavior. The latter is relevant to my research because I examine the rationalizations
conservationists use to rationalize their unsustainable behavior, which is antithetical to
their values.
I. Conservationists Know of Pro-Environmental Behavior
Although it seems implicit that conservationists know more about the
environment—and, therefore, how to best act in an environmentally supportive way—
than other professionals, it is important to support this assumption with data. Research
has demonstrated that environmental knowledge is associated with conservation group
membership and education (Maloney and Ward, 1973; Arcury, 1990). However, more
recent research found that conservationists score no better than economists on
environmental knowledge and knowledge of pro-environmental behavior (Balmford et
al., 2017). This may be attributable to similar levels of higher education, but it does imply
that conservationists have environmental knowledge and an understanding of proenvironmental behavior.
Furthermore, research has observed that individuals with more positive attitudes
towards the environment reported more pro-environmental behaviors (Blissing-Olson,
Iyer, Fielding, and Zacher, 2013; Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002). I think this can be
extended to conservationists because I would argue that most have positive attitudes
towards the environment. The literature indicates that conservationists have
environmental knowledge and are familiar with pro-environmental behavior.
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II. Environmental Education Does Not Always Result in Pro-Environmental
Behavior
There was a long-standing belief, supported by research, that environmental
education resulted in people altering their behavior to act in a more environmentally
supportive way (Carter, 1998; Arcury, 1990). However, more recent research suggests
that this direct cause-and-effect relationship may be less common and more complicated
than originally thought (Arcury, 1990; Bamberg & Möser, 2007; Bolderdijk, Gorsira,
Keizer, & Steg, 2013; Balmford et al., 2017).
A recent study found that environmental education only works to motivate proenvironmental behavior if the population being educated values the environment;
moreover, it had no effect on the people who cared less about the environment
(Bolderdijk, Gorsira, Keizer, & Steg, 2013). This is consistent with previous research,
which found that awareness of environmental issues is not a direct determinant of proenvironmental intention (Bamberg & Möser, 2007). Although environmental education is
important, the literature reveals that a multitude of additional factors impact one’s
willingness and ability to behave in an environmentally supportive way.
A. Factors That Influence Pro-Environmental Behavior
While someone may recognize the necessity of behaving in an environmentally
sustainable way, one’s intention to do so may be mediated by a plethora of social,
cultural, personal, and other internal and external factors. The social factors include
norms, religion, urban-rural differences, social class, proximity to problematic
environmental sites, and cultural and ethnic values (Bamberg & Möser, 2007; Gifford &
Nilsson, 2014; Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002). The value disparities that regional
differences create can also influence pro-environmental behavior. For example, one study
illuminated the fact that being environmentally conscious conforms to traditional Asian
values, while Western people tend to believe that this way of thinking opposes their
traditional values (Aoyagi-Usui, Vinken, & Kuribayashi, 2003).
A study determined the personal factors that influence environmental behavior to
be one’s personal values (such as social or environmental values), political and world
views childhood experience, knowledge and education, personality, sense of control,
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goals, felt responsibility, cognitive bias, place attachment, age, gender, and chosen
activities (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002). Other internal factors that impact proenvironmental behavior include motivation, emotion, locus of control, and priorities
(Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002). External locus of control, or the belief that what you do
impacts the world around you, has a role to play in pro-environmental behavior. A study
published in the Journal of Business Ethics concluded that the more a consumer believed
their purchasing decision had an impact (“consumer effectiveness”), the more sustainable
their consumption choices (Antonetti & Maklan, 2014).
Other researchers reviewing how to encourage pro-environmental behavior
determined, however, that behavior is often habitual and governed by automated
cognitive processes, rather than being preceded by complex reasoning (Steg & Vlek,
2009). This could either be interpreted to mean that the factors the previous research
discussed may not have as dynamic of an effect on behavior as they suggest, or it could
signify that these factors are subconscious influencers on behavior rather than conscious.
B. The Paradox of Conservationists Behaving Unsustainably
The study that served as the foundation and source of data for my research, “The
environmental footprints of conservationists, economists and medics compared,” was
relatively controversial when it was published in Biological Conservation in 2017. The
findings of the study support the mounting literature that recognizes that conservationists
do not always live in the most sustainable manner (Balmford et al., 2017; Alcock et al.,
2017; Kennedy, Mcfarlane, Beckley, & Nadeau, 2009; Bearzi, 2008). Furthermore,
conservationists often expect others to alter their behavior based on evidence that it has
negative impacts on the environment while they themselves continue to participate in
unsustainable activities (Bearzi, 2008; Balmford et al., 2017).
Air travel, in particular, is an activity with well-documented negative
environmental externalities that conservationists participate in quite regularly (Alcock et
al., 2017). A body of researched has emerged to address this issue, with researchers
proposing carbon-offsetting conferences and alternative transportation systems to them
(Bossdorf, Parepa, & Fischer, 2010; Stroud & Feeley, 2014; Waring et al., 2014; Fois et
al., 2016).
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This issue may not have been addressed sooner because psychological research

has demonstrated that when other ingroup members (in this case, fellow conservationists)
behave immorally, people’s desire to maintain a morally upstanding group image may
cause them to feel threatened and get defensive rather than addressing and altering the
immoral behavior (van, Ellemers, & Doosje, 2015). Research has established that
unethical behavior is perpetuated when people are able to justify their unethical actions as
being morally acceptable (Bersoff, 1999). What is more, research has determined that
jeopardizing the ability of people to construct neutralizations for their unethical behavior
resulted in a decrease in these actions (Bersoff, 1999; Antonetti & Maklan, 2014). For
example, in a study conducted by David M. Bersoff, participants in the experimental
group were overpaid for taking part in a study. When the circumstances were
manipulated to impede participants’ ability to rationalize-away their behavior, Bersoff
noticed a decrease in the number of participants who accepted the overpayment—the
unethical behavior—rather than denying it and returning the money (Bersoff, 1999). This
reveals that although people do transgress their morals and behave contrary to their
values, there are intervention methods that may decrease this unethical behavior. These
intervention methods may include the manipulation methods Bersoff used to impede
rationalizing behavior in his study, such as asking the individual about their unethical
behavior as they were about to engage in it, humanizing the actors the individual’s
behavior would negatively effect if he or she went through with the unethical behavior,
and evaluating the behavior of people who, when faced with a similar choice as the
individual, chose to engage in the unethical behavior (Bersoff, 1999). Another study
found that in the context of consumer purchasing decisions, eliciting emotional reactions
that increased the agency of a consumer counterbalanced the ability of the participants to
utilize neutralization techniques (Antonetti & Maklan, 2014). Perhaps these methods
could be enlisted to disrupt the ability of conservationists to rationalize-away their
unsustainable behavior and, as a result, lead to a decrease in the unsustainable behavior
altogether.
III. Morals & Values Do Not Always Translate to Behavior
One may intend to behave a certain way, but myriad reasons can influence one to
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behave dissonant to this intention (Ajzen, 1991; Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002; Ajzen,
2006; Neal, Wood, Labrecque, & Lally, 2012; Michie, Atkins, & West, 2014). For
example, after being informed about environmental issues, someone may want to change
their behavior to reflect one’s newfound environmental values. However, factors such as
subjective norms surrounding the behavior change, responsibilities, priorities, and
perceived behavior control can result in the person who values the environment to refrain
from changing their behavior (Ajzen, 1991; Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002). For example,
if the dominant culture people belong to encourages an unsustainable lifestyle, it is less
likely that they will break that cultural norm and alter their behavior (Kollmuss &
Agyeman, 2002). Another example of this would be if a parent who prioritizes his or her
child’s needs was told that they would have to make their children take a dangerous
public transportation system to get to school rather than by person vehicle to live
sustainably. The parent may not stop driving their child to school every day because they
believe that doing so would be going against his or her priorities.
According to the Theory of Planned Behavior, perceived behavior control is
comprised of self-efficacy (one’s belief about whether or not one is physically capable of
performing the behavior) and controllability (the extent to which conduct is up to the
actor) (Bandura, Caprara, Barbaranelli, Pastorelli, & Regalia, 2001; Ajzen, 2006).
Perceived behavior control, attitude toward the behavior, and subjective norms all act
together to influence the behavior of the actor (Ajzen, 2006).
However, the new Behavior Change Wheel provides a more comprehensive
depiction of the various factors that can influence one’s likelihood to alter their behavior
(Michie, Atkins, & West, 2014). The wheel is comprised of three tiers: sources of
behavior, intervention functions, and policy categories. Sources of behavior would
include environmental knowledge and motivation to make a change while intervention
functions are leverage points that one could use to achieve changes in the policy
categories, such as imposing restrictions to enforce guidelines or using coercion to pass
legislation.
Habits the person has and the past behavior of the individual can also factor into
the likelihood that someone will alter his or her behavior (Neal, Wood, Labrecque, &
Lally, 2012; Ajzen, 1991). Overall, the literature indicates that there are a variety of
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factors—internal and external, conscious and subconscious—that can overwhelm the
desire or the intention of an individual to behave in accordance with his or her values.
IV. Types of Rationalizations
In literature section II, I mentioned that immoral behavior is perpetuated when
people are able to justify their unethical actions as being morally acceptable (Bersoff,
1999). Well, people justify their behavior by restructuring their conduct (Tsang, 2002), in
other words, by rationalizing it. Research reflected in the psychology literature has
identified specific types of rationalizations that people use to neutralize their unethical
behavior. The following defined terms are all types of rationalizations substantiated by
research:
Table 1
Rationalization Types

Definitions

Self-Sanction (SS)

Allowing yourself to do something that conflicts with
your morals for a specific reason
Deciding for yourself that a specific bad behavior is
actually good or has a positive purpose
You convince yourself an immoral behavior does not in
fact violate your moral standards
Using a positive behavior you engage in to justify
behaving in a negative or unethical manner
Altering diction to make bad conduct seem benign or
harmless
Juxtaposing your negative behavior with someone else’s
worse behavior to make yours seem less bad by
comparison
Not my fault; downplaying your role in immoral
behavior or actions
Praising yourself for doing things you view as good
and/or moral

Moral Justification (MJ)
Moral Rationalization (MR)
Moral Licensing (ML)
Sanitizing Language (SL)
Advantageous Comparison (AC)
Diffusion of Responsibility (DR)
Positive Self-Reactions (PSR)

A. Self-Sanctions
When you allow yourself to do something which conflicts with your morals for a
specific reason (Bandura, A., Barbaranelli, C., Caprara, G. V., & Pastorelli, C., 1996;
Bandura, 1999; Bandura et al., 2001). For example, after people establish a moral
standard, Self-Sanctions are used for actions that violate this standard (Bandura et al.,
2001). Although they are intangible, Self-Sanctions are powerful; they can allow people
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to selectively disengage from harmful conduct by effectively changing damaging
behavior to moral ones (Bandura et al., 1996; Bandura, 1999). This can lead to the
perpetuation of inhumane conduct (Bandura, 1999). Although, Self-Sanctions may be
beneficial in at least one respect: one study found that those who apply moral selfsanctions to detrimental conduct behave less readily anger, behave in a less injurious
manner, and are more prone to fostering pro-social relations than those who do not
(Bandura et al., 1996). This may indicate that the acting of employing Self-Sanctions is
an act of self-preservation.
B. Moral Rationalization
This is where you convince yourself that an immoral behavior does not in fact
violate your moral standards (Tsang, 2002; Bhattacharjee, A., Berman, J. Z., & Reed, A.,
II., 2013; Schwartz, 2016). The way Moral Rationalization neutralizes behavior is
because it postulates, “people can violate their moral standards because they have
convinced themselves that their behavior is not immoral at all” (Tsang, 2002). Moral
Rationalization can be involved “in small unethical acts, such as cheating on taxes, as
well as large atrocities such as the Holocaust” (Tsang, 2002). Another example of its use
in a small unethical act would be if “the envy of one’s work colleagues who are paid
more than oneself for the same performance…lead one to morally rationalize padding
expense accounts” (Schwartz, 2016). Moral rationalization can be dangerous because it
can allow people to preserve their moral self-concept while committing an immoral
behavior, which leads it to be used to justify both small unethical acts as well as serious
evil acts (Tsang, 2002; Schwartz, 2016).
C. Moral Justification
Portraying immoral behavior as actually having a positive purpose (Rapoport &
Alexander, 1982; Sanford & Comstock, 1971; Bandura et al., 1996; Bandura, 1999;
Bandura et al., 2001; Tsang, 2002). The cognitive process of Moral Justification works
by portraying conduct as being in the service of a valued social or moral purpose
(Bandura 1996; Tsang 2002). For example, “the Nazi government of Germany made use
of moral justification in representing the genocide of Jewish people not as murder but as
‘the holiest human right and…obligation’…” (Tsang, 2002). Another extreme example of
Moral Justification is its employment as a way to neutralize the use of punitive conduct
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directed towards people who have been dehumanized by insisting that the punishment is
beneficial and necessary (Bandura et al., 1996). Once the behavior has been mentally
reconstrued, the person “can then act on a moral imperative” (Bandura et al., 1996;
Bandura, 1999). This makes sense of the famous Voltaire quote, “Those who can make
you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities” (Bandura, 1999).
D. Advantageous Comparison
Juxtaposing your negative behaviors with the far worse behavior of someone else,
making yours seem less bad by comparison (Bandura, 1991; Bandura et al., 1996;
Bandura 1999; Bandura et al., 2001; Tsang 2002). Advantageous Comparison can make
poor behavior appear benign by contrasting it with detrimental conduct (Bandura, 1999;
Bandura et al., 2001). For example, Nazi doctors who administered lethal injections to
Jew in concentration camps could have used Advantageous Comparison “by comparing
their method of killing with the more painful method of execution by shooting. In this
way, they could have reinterpreted their action as ‘mercy killings’ rather than coldblooded killings” (Tsang, 2002). The more egregious the contrasted activities, “the more
likely it is that one’s own injurious conduct will appear trifling or even benevolent”
(Bandura, 1991; Bandura et al., 1996).
E. Sanitizing Language
Altering diction to make immoral or negative conduct seem benevolent or
harmless (Bandura, 1990; Bandura et al., 1996; Bandura, 1999; Bandura et al., 2001).
This results in relieving those who use it of personal agency (Bandura, 1990; Bandura et
al., 1996). For example, studies have found that people behave much more aggressively
when the act of assaulting someone is a given a sanitized label compared to when it is
just called “aggression” (Bandura et al., 1996). The reason that this method of mentally
restructuring conduct is effective is because “[a]ctivities can take on very different
appearances depending on what they are called” (Bandura, 1999).
F. Diffusion of Responsibility
Downplaying your role in immoral behavior (Darley & Latané, 1968; Milgram,
1974; Bandura, 1999; Bandura et al., 2001; Tsang, 2002; Zimbardo, 2008). This
cognitive process works by “deflecting responsibility onto others and away from the self”
(Tsang, 2002). For example, in one study, college students believed they were either
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alone in hearing an epileptic seizure or that 1 or 4 unseen others were also present
(Darley & Latané, 1968). The presence of bystanders reduced the individual’s feeling of
responsibility and lowered his or her speed of reporting the incident (Darley & Latané,
1968). In this instance, the urgency the participant felt to report the emergency
diminished as a result of believing that other individuals could take it upon themselves to
report the emergency instead. A more mundane example of Diffusion of Responsibility
can be found in a group decision-making situation. Each person could believe that the
group, rather than oneself, is responsible for a poor decision (Tsang, 2002).
G. Moral Licensing
Using a positive behavior you engage in to justify behaving in a negative or
immoral way (Monin & Miller, 2001; Khan & Dhar, 2006; Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin,
2009; Jordan, Mullen, & Murnighan, 2011; Barkan, Ayal, Gino, & Ariely, 2012). For
example, after one experiences an event that gives a boost to the moral self, one may
relax his or her ethical standards, becoming more likely to engage in immoral or
unethical behavior (Barkan et al., 2012). This cognitive process is also visible in
consumer purchasing behavior. Researchers have found that committing to a virtuous act
“reduces negative self-attributions associated with the purchase of relative luxuries”
(Khan & Dhar, 2006). This is another instance of a moral “boost” resulting in one
participating in an unfavorable behavior, which is the essence of Moral Licensing.
H. Positive Self-Reactions
Praising yourself for conducting yourself in a way that you view as moral and/or
good (Bandura, 1991; Bandura et al., 2001). Positive Self-Reactions for one’s moral
behavior paired with negative Self-Sanctions serve as the regulatory influences for one’s
moral standards (Bandura, 1991). Furthermore, research has demonstrated that
anticipatory positive and negative self-reactions for different courses of action are what
get people to behave in accordance with their moral standards (Bandura, 1991). Also,
Bandura believes that people pursue behaviors that result in Positive Self-Reactions and
avoid those that bring about negative self-reactions (Bandura, 1991). As an educational
report from the University of Melbourne Graduate School of Education outlines, Positive
Self-Reactions can also be employed in a self-reflection setting to adapt to and mediate
dissatisfaction (Harding et al., 2018). This is accomplished by having students recognize
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what aspects of their performance they are satisfied with (Harding et al., 2018). The
reflection dimension to Positive Self-Reactions is what this research focuses on.

OBJECTIVES
My aim was to analyze a subset of the survey data collected by the authors of the
recently published Biological Conservation paper, “The environmental footprints of
conservationists, economists and medics compared” to answer questions about
environmental decisions and rationalizing behavior. The literature review above informs
the following questions: do the survey respondents use the opportunity to comment on
their actions to rationalize their unsustainable behavior? Furthermore, do conservationists
rationalize their behavior more than the other professionals surveyed? Finally, what types
of rationalizations do the respondents use to justify their behavior? We hypothesized that
conservationists would rationalize their behavior more than both the economists and the
medical professionals. We also assumed that the most common type of rationalization
conservationists used would be moral licensing and that respondents would only
rationalize their unsustainable behavior—when they received a poor score for a particular
domain of behavior.

METHODS
Using data from the survey, we were able to evaluate our research questions and
the validity of our hypotheses. The survey had 734 respondents: 300 conservationists,
207 economists, and 227 medics. We decided to focus our research on responses
collected in response to the following questions:
1) For the most part, what method to you use to travel most of the distance to get
to work?
2) Roughly how many of your week’s meals contain meat (including fish and
chicken)?
3) Roughly how many flights do you take in the average year?
We chose to focus on these 3 questions (hereafter referred to as “the 3 questions”)
because after each of these questions was posed in the survey, the respondent had the
opportunity to comment on their answer; an optional question that simply stated: “Feel
free to tell us why.”
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I analyzed all of the comments (or lack of comments) made by the

conservationists, economists, and medical professionals for all 3 questions, for a total of
2,202 cells of data—comments comprising about 1/3 of that list. For my first evaluation
of the data, my aim was to determine the frequency the conservationists, economists, and
medics, respectively, commented on their behavior. To do so, I scored each cell (all
2,202) with a 0 if the individual did not fill in a comment or a 1 if the individual did fill in
a comment. Next, I sought to ascertain the proportion of comments that were
rationalizations to those that were just statements—comments that were not
rationalizations (e.g. “You mean - the flight is ‘3 hours or less?’ that is the way I
answered this”). Comments that I assessed to be statements were given a score of 1 and
rationalizations were given a score of 2. If no comment was left, a score of 0 was given.
To detect the types of rationalizations respondents used to justify their behavior, I
categorized the comments that I scored a 2 in the previous section into the following
rationalization categories: Self-Sanction (SS), Moral Justification (MJ), Moral
Rationalization (MR), Moral Licensing (ML), Sanitizing Language (SL), Advantageous
Comparison (AC), Diffusion of Responsibility (DR), and Positive Self-Reactions (PSR).
These specific rationalization types were chosen as the categories because they were cited
frequently in the literature and are the most applicable to the content in the comments.
This interpretation of the data was subjective—it was based on my assessments of the
respondents’ comments, informed by the literature and my own judgment.
Because there is a degree of subjectivity in identifying the type of rationalization
used, Professor Brendan Fisher evaluated and scored the first 20 comments for each
profession for the meat consumption question (for a total of 60 responses) without the
ability to see the scores I had given each comment to determine if my assessments were
reliable. We had a 35% agreement rate, so we discussed our methods of classifying and
decided to re-evaluate our classifications. I went back over the responses and re-classified
all of them, while Professor Fisher re-classified the ones we disagreed on the first time.
After this second round, we had an 80% agreement rate. We then discussed the remaining
outliers.
We then calculated the point estimate and 95% confidence intervals for the
rationalization versus statements data for each of the three behaviors and performed a
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Chi-square test to determine if there were correlations across the decision to rationalize
across the three behaviors.
At the suggestion of Dr. Chris Sandbrook, I also organized rationalizations for
each of the three questions into two categories: people who scored poorly (<1) on the
survey and people who scored well on the survey (1). This was to ascertain if there was a
difference between the way people who performed poorly rationalize their behavior
versus those who scored well (e.g. how people who eat 20 meat meals per week
rationalize their behavior versus those who eat 0 meat meals per week).

RESULTS
Conservationists took the opportunity to comment on their behavior more than the
other professionals for all three behaviors (Fig. 1). For the meat behavior,
conservationists commented on their meat eating habits about twice as much as both the
economists and medical professionals did (Fig. 1). Figure 1 also demonstrates that more
people commented on their daily commuting behavior than on any of the three behaviors
analyzed.
Figure 1
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When given the option to comment on each of the three behaviors, survey
respondents primarily used the opportunity to rationalize their behavior (Fig. 2). The only
instance where this was not the case was for economists whose comments on their meat
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consumption constituted more statements than they did rationalizations (Fig. 2). The
prompt to comment on one’s air travel elicited the greatest proportion of rationalized
responses to statements across all three occupations (Fig. 2). Conservationists were not
more likely than the economists or the medics to rationalize their daily commute or air
travel behaviors (Fig. 3). However, conservationists were 1.6x more likely to rationalize
their meat consumption compared to economists (Fig. 3).
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Figure 3
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Positive Self-Reaction was the most common type of rationalization offered when
people were allowed to comment on their meat consumption (Fig. 4). As such, the bulk of
the comments were where respondents praised themselves for their eating habits. More
people who scored poorly (<1) on the survey chose to comment on their meat
consumption behavior than those who received a good score (1) (Fig. 4). Conservationists
and medical professionals who scored poorly on the survey for their meat consumption
primarily used Self-Sanctions, Positive Self-Reactions, and Diffusion of Responsibility,
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respectively, to rationalize their unsustainable behavior (Fig. 4). This differs from
economists, who primarily used Moral Justifications, Positive Self-Reactions, and Moral
Licensing to rationalize their unsustainable mean consumption (Fig. 4). With the
exception of one economist, all of the professionals who commented on their meat
consumption even though they received a good score on the survey used Positive SelfReactions (Fig. 4).
Figure 4
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Figure 4 (Continued)
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For daily commuting behavior, Self-Sanction was the most common type of
rationalization type used by all three professions surveyed (Fig. 5). Positive Self-Reaction
was the second most common type of comment offered for respondents’ daily commuting
behavior (Fig. 5). More people who scored poorly on the survey chose to comment on
their daily commuting behavior than those who received a good score (Fig. 5). People
who scored poorly on the survey for their commuting behavior overwhelmingly used
Self-Sanctions to justify their unsustainable behavior (Fig. 5). Those who scored well on
the survey for their commuting behavior primarily offered Positive Self-Reactions as
their comments (Fig. 5). Far more conservationists commented on their behavior when
they scored well on the survey than the economists and medics did (Fig. 5).
Figure 5

Number	
  of	
  Comments	
  

Types	
  of	
  Rationalizations	
  Used	
  for	
  Commuting	
  Method	
  
200	
  
150	
  
100	
  

Medics	
  

50	
  

Economists	
  
Conservationists	
  

0	
  
Self-‐Sanction	
  

Moral	
  
JustiHication	
  

Moral	
  
Licensing	
  

Diffusion	
  of	
   Positive	
  Self-‐
Responsibility	
   Reaction	
  

Type	
  of	
  Rationalization	
  

	
  

23	
  23	
  

Figure 5 (Continued)
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Self-Sanction was the most common rationalization offered by respondents to
explain their air travel behavior (Fig. 6). More people who scored poorly on the survey
chose to comment on their air travel behavior than those who received a good score (Fig.
6). Respondents who scored poorly on the survey for their air travel behavior most
commonly utilized Self-Sanctions, Positive Self-Reactions, and Moral Justifications to
rationalize their unsustainable behavior (Fig. 6). Although Positive Self-Reactions were
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the most commonly offered comment by the individuals who scored well on the survey
for their air travel behavior, Self-Sanctions, Moral Justifications, and even Advantageous
Comparisons were also offered, respectively (Fig. 6).

Figure 6
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Figure 6 (Continued)
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Conservationists were more likely to use more than one type of rationalization in
their comment to justify their behavior. This was most evident for comments on meat
consumption behavior (Fig. 7).
Figure 7
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We tested if a person’s willingness to rationalize one behavior meant they were

more willing to rationalize another. We found no results of this. The results of the Chisquare test for rationalizing air travel and meat consumption behaviors were: X-squared =
72.3005, df = 1, p-value < 2.2e-16. For air travel and daily commute behaviors, the
results were as follows: X-squared = 21.1015, df = 1, p-value = 4.356e-06. The results for
daily commute and meat consumption behaviors were as follows: X-squared = 27.6091,
df = 1, p-value = 1.485e-07. These Chi-square results indicate that there is no correlation
across the three behaviors. Meaning, just because a person rationalized his or her meat
consumption, for example, does not mean he or she was more likely to rationalize his or
her daily commute or air travel behaviors.
What follows is overview of some of the comments respondents made to
rationalize their behavior. This is included to reveal what kinds of comments people of
different professions made to justify their behavior. This section can also give further
insight into our process for categorizing the comments as Self-Sanctions, Moral
Justifications, Moral Rationalizations, Moral Licensing, Sanitizing Language,
Advantageous Comparison, Diffusion of Responsibility, Positive Self-Reactions, or a
combination of these.
An example of a Self-Sanction is the following response, which a conservationist
shared on the survey for the meat question: “I'm veggie for all except one sustainable fish
meal per week -for health reasons.” I would classify this as a SS because the person is
allowing himself to transgress his morals for a specific reason, his health.
A Moral Justification is where a person decides for him or herself that a specific
behavior is actually good or has a positive purpose. This conservationist used MJ to
rationalize her choice to drive to work in her response: “It is the most affordable way to
travel in terms of money and the most efficient way to travel in terms of time.” Moral
Justification was a very popular way conservationists rationalized their air travel. For
example, one wrote that they fly: “To facilitate or support corporate-NGO partnerships
which deliver meaningful conservation outcomes for priority species or sites.” Another
rationalized her choice to use a car to commute to work by writing: “I work very late and
the car saves time, allowing me to do more for the planet overall. :).”
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Moral Rationalization is where you convince yourself that an immoral behavior

does not, in fact, violate your moral standards. This medical professional, for example,
feels no personal responsibility to eat in a sustainable manner, responding to rationalize
why he does not eat meat: “Because vegetarians/vegans are possibly some of the most
pretentious people on the planet.”
Using a positive behavior one engages in to justify behaving in a negative or
immoral way is the concept of Moral Licensing. This idea is expertly demonstrated by
this conservationist’s rationalization for his method of commuting to work: “I live 37
miles away. (But I drive a Toyota Prius hybrid.).” Another example of ML would be this
conservationist’s rationalization for the way they commute to work: “I work from home
for 80% of the time but when I do go to the office I need to drive.”
Sanitizing Language refers to when someone alters his or her diction to make
immoral conduct seem benign or harmless. The responses I identified as using SL were
most frequently in the rationalizations to the meat question. For example, several
respondents manufactured names to describe their unsustainable consumption of meat.
One conservationist wrote, “I consider myself as a demetarian,” while an economist
responded, “I am a ‘flexitarian’, prefer vegetarian food and will eat fish and chicken; do
not eat red meat.” A medic attempted to rationalize her unsustainable behavior by
concluding, “I am 'reducetarian' - I think there is a small health benefit to eating meat, but
I try to keep in low for ethical and environmental reasons.”
Advantageous Comparison is when one juxtaposes one’s negative behavior with
the far more severe behavior of someone else, making the initial behavior seem benign by
comparison. A conservationist, for example, rationalized her meat consumption patterns
by juxtaposing them with those of her family, stating: “I am personally avoiding beef and
lamb, but the rest of the family are quite carnivorous.”
Diffusion of Responsibility is one downplays one’s role in immoral behavior or
actions. For example, this conservationist blames her puppy for her unsustainable method
of commuting to work writing, “Ownership of a puppy broke a long-term habit of cycling
because of a need to return to the home at lunchtime for 6 months. That need no longer
exists but pressure of work hours means we have not returned to the habit (yet!).” This
conservationist’s response is another of example of DR: “My husband is a dedicated
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carnivore.” She used her husband’s behavior to rationalize her unsustainable meat
consumption, rather than taking responsibility for her actions. For this study, we only
classified the comment as DR if the blame was placed on a living being. Blame placed on
inanimate objects, preferences, infrastructural limitations,	
  etcetera were classified as SelfSanctions for the sake of continuity.
Positive Self-Reactions are the fascinating phenomenon where people pat
themselves on the back for doing things that they view as good and/or moral.
Unprompted—survey respondents were not required to fill in anything—felt the need to
inform us of the positive behavior they engaged in. PSRs differ from the other
rationalization types because all of the others are used to rationalize negative or immoral
behavior. This term is used to do the opposite – it draws attention to positive or moral
behavior the person has engaged in. For example, many conservationists, economists, and
medical professionals responded simply “Vegetarian” or “Vegan” to rationalize their
sustainable behavior. These responses were considered Positive Self-Reactions.
Respondents also used PSRs to rationalize their sustainable daily commute and air travel
habits. One conservationist wrote of their decision to bike to work, “It's convenient,
inexpensive, quick, flexible, pleasurable, and non-polluting.” Another wrote, “Quickest,
easiest way. Chose where we lived so we did not need a car.” This individual is both
informing us that their sustainable behavior is more beneficial than the alternatives, and
she actively took this chosen behavior into consideration when she was selecting her
home and chose the more sustainable option.
Many respondents used multiple types of rationalizations to justify their
unsustainable behavior in their single response. For example, a conservationist
responded:
“I fly for work because this is institutional policy (but with C offsetting) and
because I believe in the value of face-to-face contact with colleagues. I fly for
holidays because overland transport to destination would reduce holiday time at
destination significantly and because flying is inexpensive relative to overland
transport and because anthropologically induced climate change is not a huge
concern to me--perhaps it should be, but I am much more concerned about other
environmental problems.”
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This response is a combination of SS, MJ, and MR rationalizations.

The individual begins by stating that she allows herself to fly for the specific reason of
valuing face-to-face interactions for work, a SS. She then goes on to write that flying
actually has a positive purpose – it allows her to increase the amount of time she is able
to spend at her holiday destination, a MJ. The conservationist concludes by deciding that
flying does not even, in fact, violate her morals – stating that it is “not a huge concern” to
her and that she is “much more concerned about other environmental problems,” a MR.
Another example of this three-tiered rationalization is the following response to
the air travel question by a different conservationist: “My job requires frequent travel for
meetings and conferences. My family lives in North America and partner's family in
South America, so we are forced to fly long distance to visit them. I also love to travel, it
is the one thing I will not sacrifice despite my environmental values.” This response
begins with an SS, the individual allows herself to fly for the specific reason of her
career. She then downplays her role in making the choice to fly by explaining that she is
“forced to fly” to visit her partner’s family, a clear DR. Finally, she states that flying has
the positive purpose of making her happy, a MJ. This last piece could also be classified as
an SS because she writes that she will fly for the specific reason that she enjoys traveling.

DISCUSSION
Our results suggest the following answers to my main questions posed in the
Objectives section:
1. Respondents used the opportunity to comment on their actions to rationalize their
unsustainable behavior. In fact, more people who scored poorly on the survey
commented on their behavior than people who scored well.
2. Conservationists were more likely to rationalize their meat consumption behavior
than economists. Otherwise, there was no significant difference between the
likelihood of conservationists, economists, and medical professionals to
rationalize their behavior.
3. Respondents primarily used Self-Sanctions, Positive Self-Reactions, and Moral
Justification to rationalize their behavior, using Self-Sanctions and Moral
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Justification to rationalize their unsustainable behavior and offering Positive SelfReactions to comment on their good (well-scoring) behavior.

Self-Sanctions
Because Self-Sanctions were the most common type of comment given to
rationalize the respondent’s unsustainable behavior, it is worth examining the specific
reasons respondents offered to justify their behavior. For meat consumption, the most
common reasons cited by respondents to account for their unsustainable meat intake was
that they required protein and there were no viable protein alternatives to meat, preferred
meat, had a habit of eating meat, or that the meat they ate was sustainably sourced or
produced. Citing that their meat consumption behavior was a force of habit is consistent
with literature on behavior determination, which states that behavior is often habitual and
governed by automated cognitive processes (Steg & Vlek, 2009). Respondents who
pointed to their need for a “good” source of protein may suggest a lack of self-efficacy,
one’s belief about whether or not one is physically capable of performing the behavior
(Bandura et al., 2001; Ajzen, 2006). For example, people may have the desire and the
motivation to eat a vegetarian diet, but they could believe that they would be physically
incapable of maintaining one because it would not sustain them. This suggests that more
research into and education about alternative sources of protein to meat may be a
beneficial avenue of work if we are to push more sustainable diets.
The most common reasons respondents cited to account for their unsustainable
commuting behavior were a lack of access to public transportation or pedestrian/cyclist
infrastructure, unsanitary or crowded public transportation options, safety concerns
around biking and public transportation, distance to work, and impracticality of driving
alternatives. These reasons are consistent with those referred to by the literature as
interfering with a person’s ability to behave in a pro-environmental manner:
responsibilities, priorities, and perceived behavior control (Ajzen, 1991; Kollmuss &
Agyeman, 2002). The fact that there is no public transportation infrastructure, for
example, reflects a lack of controllability, which falls under the perceived behavior
control category (Bandura et al., 2001; Ajzen, 2006). The reasons given suggest that a
demand for sustainable transportation is currently going unmet. Furthermore, if we are to
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expect people to alter their daily commuting method, we must address the constraints
limiting or discouraging them from doing so.
Although the question gave respondents the opportunity to comment on their
leisure flight travel, many offered rationalizations of their work flight travel in the
comments. The most common reasons cited to account for their unsustainable flight
travel behavior were work necessity and conference attendance. This is consistent with
literature published in recent years that addresses the paradox of conservationists flying
in the name of conservation science (Bossdorf, Parepa, & Fischer, 2010; Waring et al.,
2014; Fois et al., 2016; Alcock et al., 2017). There is much to evaluate in this area of
study, such as developing alternative ways to conduct international conservation science
and facilitate information sharing.
Positive Self-Reactions
At the beginning of this research process, it did not even occur to Dr. Fisher or me
that survey respondents would used the opportunity to comment on their behavior to
praise themselves for their positive behavior. However, this certainly was the case, with
the second most common type of rationalization offered in the comments being Positive
Self-Reactions. Respondents who had been vegetarians for 30 years were sure to inform
the survey that this was the case. The comments on commuting behavior elicited the most
Positive Self-Reactions, with conservationist after conservationist praising him or herself
for living close to work, bicycling every day, or spending no money on gasoline. Nearly
as many conservationists offered a Positive Self-Reaction for their meat consumption
behavior as they did Self-Sanctions. This could indicate that less of a focus should be
placed on imploring people to alter their meat consumption behavior; rather, time and
resources should be spent addressing the reasons respondents cited to justify their
unsustainable meat consumption.
Moral Justification
Many respondents rationalized their behavior by commenting the positive
purposed that their unsustainable behavior had. For meat, the positives were that it was a
great source of protein and was an important component of a diverse, healthy diet. The

	
  

32	
  

benefits of using a car to commute to work included that they were time effective,
convenient, and safer than the public transportation or cycling options available to the
respondent. Respondents commented that flying to their vacation destination was cost
effective, enabled them to have more time at their destination (less time commuting
there), allowed them to visit their family more frequently, and a was a more pleasurable
experience than other methods of travel. Astoundingly, quite a few conservationists
conveyed that visiting their conservation site or attending a conference here and there
was worth the impact their flight would have on the planet. This finding puts how
conservationists practice their discipline into question. Are there more sustainable ways
to conduct this work? Also, this research suggests that sustainable diet, commuting, and
travel method alternatives will need to meet or exceed these benefits for them to be viable
and adaptable.
Research Constraints
For conservationists, it was not a stretch to assume that if someone is a
conservationist, then they value the environment. This made categorizing the comments
into the different rationalization types simple. The issue is that rationalizations are what
allow people to transgress their morals. For this research, we made the assumption that
valuing the environment is an implicit and intrinsic moral shared by everyone, because
we rely on the environment for essential ecosystem services. Therefore, any behavior one
engages in that negatively impacts the environment would be considered an immoral
behavior. In reality, unfortunately, it may not be true to say that everyone values the
environment. If this is the case, then only the rationalizations made by people who
explicitly state that they value the environment are relevant.
The implications of these results only apply to the population of individuals
surveyed for this research. This means that these findings are unlikely to be directly
applicable to people in developing nations or people in lower income brackets. Rather,
these findings are more relevant to people in developed nations and in a higher pay grade.
For example, excessive meat consumption far more of an issue in the United States than
it is in Nigeria, where many cannot afford to eat meat in excess. Therefore, this research
must only be used in the context of its survey population and those similar to it.
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Leverage Points & Future Areas of Study
The results of this study support the idea that one of the reasons conservationists
are able to engage in unsustainable behavior is because they are able to rationalize it
away. This claim is backed by literature, which states that neutralizations can facilitate
the perpetuation of immoral behavior (Bersoff, 1999; Tsang, 2002; Antonetti & Maklan,
2014). The literature also reveals that interrupting the ability of people to neutralize their
actions by rationalizing them away can result in a change in their behavior (Bersoff,
1999; Antonetti & Maklan, 2014). Thus, an area of future research could be putting this
theory to the test and assessing if interrupting the ability of conservationists to
rationalize-away their unsustainable behavior would make them likely to engage in it in
the future. Identifying leverage points like this could be the key to leveraging
conservationists and people of all occupations alike to live more sustainable lifestyles.
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